More on al-Marri ruling

The NYT has a good op-ed up on the Fourth Circuit's Ali al-Marri ruling. Here is a taste:

The Bush administration has been a waging a fierce battle for the power to lock people up indefinitely simply on the president’s say-so. It scored a disturbing victory last week when a federal appeals court ruled that it could continue to detain Ali al-Marri, who has been held for more than five years as an enemy combatant. The decision gives the president sweeping power to deprive anyone — citizens as well as noncitizens — of their freedom. The Supreme Court should reverse this terrible ruling.

4th Circuit dangerously expands alleged "wartime power"

The Fourth Circuit Court of appeals, in a fractured en banc decisions, held that the President has the legal power to order the indefinite military detentions of civilians captured in the United States. However, the Court also ruled that Ali al-Marri, a citizen of Qatar now in military custody in Charleston, S.C., must be given an additional opportunity to challenge his detention in federal court there. The case is likely to reach the Supreme Court.

The Washington Post has this article on the decision.

Fourth Circuit decides defamation suit againt NYT

In Hatfill v. The New York Times, the Fourth Circuit upheld the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Times. Hatfill alleged that a series of columns published in the newspaper implicated him in the 2001 anthrax mailings that killed five people and sickened 17 others. Key to the holding was that Hatfill is a limited purpose public figure. The court held that Hatfill was accorded this status because he publicly discussed the threat of bioterrorism and the nation’s lack of preparedness for such an attack both before and after the attacks.

As a public figure, Hatfill would have to prove actual malice to succeed in a libel suit against the Times. The Fourth Circuit held that no reasonable jury could have found actual malice.

Indeed, the record contains substantial evidence to support TheNew York Times' contention that Kristof actually believed that Dr.Hatfill was the prime suspect. At the time that Kristof wrote his columns,he knew from several sources that Dr. Hatfill fit the profile that the FBI had developed and that he had been identified specifically by the FBI as a suspect who should be investigated carefully. In conducting research for his columns, Kristof had reviewed many previously published articles about Dr. Hatfill, which recounted that he had been questioned by the FBI more than once; that he had voluntarily vaccinated himself against anthrax shortly before the mailings; that he had access to labs where anthrax was stored; that he had knowledge about anthrax’s use as a weapon; that he had strong views about the bioterrorism threat; that he had agreed that his "background naturally drew the FBI’s attention"; that he had spoken frequently about possible bioterrorism; and that he lost his security clearance after he failed a polygraph test shortly before the mailings. In addition, Kristof reviewed numerous documents, including Dr. Hatfill’s resume and various reports, papers, and letters written by him describing his knowledge of bioterrorism and biological weapons.

S.C. Supreme Court upholds death for Freddie Owens

The Greenville News has this story.

S.C. Court of Appeals upholds discovery sanction of striking answer for failure to produce documents

In McNair v. Fairfield County, the Court of Appeals upheld the sanction of striking the County's answer in a condemnation case. The County had not produced documents 7 ½ months after the trial court granted plaintiff's motion to compel. At the 11th hour the county promised to have all discovery matters cleared up within one month, but failed to do so. The Court of Appeals held that this course of conduct warranted the trial court's striking of the answer.

S.C. Court of Appeals holds that professional negligence claims are assignable

In Fowler v. Hunter, the court of appeals considered the assignability of professional negligence claims. The Fowlers were seriously injured when the motorcycle they were riding was struck by a car driven by Sallie Hunter. The car was owned by Gynecologic Oncology Associates (“GOA”) for use by Mrs. Hunter’s husband, Dr. James Hunter. Auto-Owners Insurance Company insured the car under a business automobile policy with limits of one million dollars. At least two other policies potentially provided coverage. One was a commercial umbrella policy for four million dollars procured by GOA through Insurance Associates and issued by Selective. The other policy at issue was a personal catastrophic liability policy for two million dollars carried by the Hunters and also issued by Selective.

After settling certain claims, the Hunters and GOA assigned their professional negligence claim against Insurance Associates to the Fowlers, and the Fowlers signed a covenant not to execute against the Hunters and GOA. The Hunters and GOA agreed to cooperate with the Fowlers in the prosecution of the professional negligence claim, and the Fowlers and Selective agreed to split equally any recovery from either the professional negligence or indemnification claim. The trial court held that such an assignment was impermissible and granted summary judgment. The court of appeals reversed.

The Court of Appeals held that this assignment was permissible and stressed that there was little evidence of collusion between the settling parties. "In light of our State’s willingness to place the interests of the injured party above such a technical application of the law, we believe it was inappropriate for the claim to be dismissed at the summary judgment stage."

Fourth Circuit upholds suprevised release requirement of intramuscular injections of antipsychotic drugs

In United States v. Holman, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals considered the propriety of a condition of supervised release requiring that Holman participate in mental health treatment and take all prescribed medication, including intramuscular injections of an antipsychotic drug. Holman challenged the condition of supervised release as violating protected liberty interest. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s decision. The court found that there was ample evidence that when Holman is off his medication he poses a danger to himself and others. The court also noted that the district court’s order was narrowly tailored to the circumstances of the case because Holman only became a danger when he was off his medication and long-lasting antipsychotic drugs provide the only means of insuring that Holman take his medication. Holman had a long history of non-compliance with medication while in prison. Finally, the record established that the involuntary-medication requirement was medically appropriate. Prison officials were generally required to use injections to stabilize Holman’s condition once he quit taking his oral medications, and Holman’s prison psychiatrist believed that the injections were his best treatment option because they prevented Holman from succumbing to the temptation to stop taking his medicine.